Negotiating Sex by Anderson, Michelle J.
Working Paper Series
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Year 2005
Negotiating Sex
Michelle J. Anderson
Villanova Law, anderson@law.villanova.edu
This paper is posted at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.
http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/wps/art33
CLEAN EDIT
101
NEGOTIATING SEX
MICHELLE J. ANDERSON*
INTRODUCTION
Adrienne had just turned thirteen. Late one autumn night, after her 
siblings and parents had fallen asleep, she crawled out of bed, walked 
downstairs to the basement, unlocked and opened the sliding glass door, 
and slipped outside.
It was Mike’s idea. He was a varsity basketball player from a nearby 
high school. Mike proposed they both sneak out and meet on the street 
halfway between their houses. Wanting Mike to like her, Adrienne agreed.
Mike never showed.
At that hour, the suburban streets were still. Adrienne walked three 
miles to Mike’s house, where she found him waiting in his front yard. He 
signaled for her to come into the house. “Don’t make any noise because my 
parents are asleep,” he said. “They’d kill me if they found us in here.” So 
throughout the night, Adrienne remained silent.
Mike led her downstairs into the family room. Now that she was 
inside his house, a deep fear set in, and Adrienne panicked. In her words, “I 
just completely left my body.”1 She does not know how her clothes came 
off. All she remembers is coming back to the intense pain of Mike 
ramming inside her. He was ripping her apart. She blacked out.
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The next thing she remembers is being in another room. Mike was 
lying on a beanbag chair, her face was in his crotch, and he was palming 
her head like a basketball. Trapped and gagging, Adrienne thought she was 
going to choke to death. She blacked out again.2
It was early in the morning when Adrienne walked home alone, slid 
through the basement door, crawled into bed, and wept herself to sleep 
before anyone in our house stirred. Five years passed before my sister 
ended her silence and told someone what had happened that night.
Adrienne suffered flashbacks and acute psychological distress. For a 
while, she was suicidal. Her reactions are not unique. Many people respond 
to sexual trauma at the time it occurs with physical paralysis and mental 
dissociation.3 Such trauma leaves many with fragmented memories.4
Nearly a third of rape victims develop rape-related Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder.5 Approximately twenty-eight percent of rape victims experience 
suicidal ideation.6
Rape, particularly acquaintance rape, is so common today that most 
people are likely to have a family member or a friend who suffered 
something similar to what Adrienne experienced.7 Despite the fact that 
Adrienne’s story is in this sense ordinary, it is extraordinary to read 
because silence still tends to shroud the issue of sexual assault—we rarely 
hear such stories in legal scholarship or in the broader world. In this article, 
Adrienne’s experience will therefore stand for many others like it that 
remain unspoken.
2. When she tried to recall the rest of that night, Adrienne wrote:
I don’t remember anything, except those few, isolated moments. When I have tried to 
remember them [years later] in therapy, I just get VERY dizzy, feel like I am floating out of 
my body, and experience sheer panic. So much so, that I have had to stop trying to remember.
Id.
3. See infra notes 70– 87 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 81– 82 a nd accompanying text.
5. NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 
CENTER, RAPE IN AMERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 7 (1992) [hereinafter RAPE IN AMERICA]. 
 6. Mary P. Koss, Thomas E. Dinero, Cynthia A. Seibel & Susan L. Cox, Stranger and 
Acquaintance Rape, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1, 13 (1988).
7. Twenty percent of women have been forced to have sexual intercourse against their will at 
some point in their lives. See JOYCE C. ABMA, PH.D., ANJANI CHANDRA, PH.D., WILLIAM D. MOSHER, 
PH.D., LINDA S. PETERSON, M.A. & LINDA J. PICCININO, M.P.S.,  FERTILITY, FAMILY PLANNING, AND 
WOMEN’S HEALTH: NEW DATA FROM THE 1995 NATIONAL DATA SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH 5, 33 
tbl.22 (National Center for Health Statistics, Vital and Health Statistics Series No. 23:19, 1997) 
[hereinafter FERTILITY AND WOMEN’S HEALTH]. A survey of 930 women in San Francisco found that 
26% of women have been raped and 46% have been subjected to rape or attempted rape. Diana E. H. 
Russell & Nancy Howell, The Prevalence of Rape in the United States Revisited, 8 SIGNS 688, 690–692 
(1983). Another survey found that one in four women have been subjected to rape or attempted rape. 
ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE 11 (1988).
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The common law defined rape as a man obtaining sexual intercourse 
with a woman by force and without her consent. In his Commentaries on 
the Laws of England, William Blackstone explained that rape was the 
“carnal knowledge of a woman forcibly and against her will.”8 “Forcibly” 
meant that the man used physical force or the threat of physical force to 
obtain sexual intercourse.9 “Against her will” meant that the woman did not 
consent to having sexual intercourse with him, and the common law 
required that she resist him to the utmost of her physical capacity to express 
her non-consent.10
The abuse Adrienne suffered was not rape under the common law.11
Mike did not have to employ physical force to penetrate her vaginally and 
orally. He never beat her or threatened her with a knife. Moreover, 
Adrienne did not resist Mike to the utmost of her physical capacity to 
express that his actions were against her will.
Despite some legislative and judicial tinkering at the margins, the 
statutes in the vast majority of states and the District of Columbia continue 
to reflect the requirements of the common law.12 Rape statutes no longer 
formally require that a victim resist her assailant to the utmost of her 
physical capacity to express a lack of consent.13 Nevertheless, statutes still 
overwhelmingly require both the defendant’s force and the victim’s non-
consent before an act of sexual penetration becomes a felony,14 and the 
way courts interpret these terms usually requires the victim’s “reasonable 
resistance.”15 Although states have slightly broadened the kinds of coercion 
8. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *210.
9. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 59 (1987).
10. Id. at 29–38.
11. It was also not statutory rape. In 1275, when statutory rape became a part of English common 
law, the age of consent was twelve. Later, the law reduced the age of consent to ten. Elizabeth A. 
Wilson, Child Sexual Abuse, the Delayed Discovery Rule, and the Problem of Finding Justice for Adult-
Survivors of Child Abuse, 12 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 145, 222 (2003). What happened to Adrienne was, 
likewise, not statutory rape under the laws of the state in which the offense occurred. Virginia defines 
statutory rape as having “sexual intercourse with a complaining witness . . . under age thirteen.” VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18.2–61(A) (West 2002). It defines in part forcible sodomy as engaging in “fellatio” 
when the “complaining witness is less than thirteen years of age.” Id. § 18.2–67.1(A).
12. See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 962–
68.
13. Id. at 966–67.
14. Id. at 1000–01.
15. See id. at 965–66. See also Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2005) (surveying state statutes).
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that they are willing to recognize as unlawful force,16 what Mike did to 
Adrienne still would not qualify within the current definition of force.
Academic proposals for rape law reform have moved well beyond 
where state laws linger. Arguing that requirements of a defendant’s force 
and a victim’s resistance are archaic and unfair, legal scholars have 
asserted that the crux of the crime of rape is sex without consent.17 Scholars 
have offered two interpretive models for understanding non-consent as the 
crux of rape. I will call the first the No Model and the second the Yes 
Model.
Under the No Model, when a woman says “no” to a man’s sexual 
advances,18 she does not consent, and courts should recognize that sexual 
penetration after that point is rape.19 In feminist lingo, “no means no.”20
Without a “no,” the law presumes the woman consents, and sexual 
penetration therefore is not rape.21 The No Model breaks from the common 
law in that it does not require the man to employ physical force to obtain 
sex, nor does it require the woman to physically resist her attacker to prove 
her non-consent.22 Instead, it requires her to verbally express her refusal.23
16. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1985) (holding force includes 
“not only physical force or violence but also moral, psychological or intellectual force used to compel a 
person to engage in sexual intercourse against that person’s will”). But see Commonwealth v. Titus, 556 
A.2d 425, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding no force was present where father had sex with 13-year-
old daughter).
17. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. 
J. WOMEN & L. 41, 64 (1993) (“[R]ape is best defined in terms of nonconsent.”); ESTRICH, supra note 
9, at 103 (“[T]he threshold of liability . . . should be understood to include at least those nontraditional 
rapes where the woman says no . . . .”); STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 254 (1998) (“Intercourse without consent should always be
considered a serious offense.”).
18. In this article, I usually refer to potential or actual rape victims as female, but occasionally I 
refer to them as male. I overwhelmingly refer to potential or actual rapists as male. I do not employ this 
nomenclature to reinforce the gender roles of male sexual aggression and female sexual victimization. 
Rather, I employ it to reflect the reality of rape. Girls and women are the most common victims of rape, 
although boys and men may also be victims. Those who engage in rape are overwhelmingly male. 
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DATA ON RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 21 tbl.2 & 24 tbl.3 (1997).
19. ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 103.
20. Id. at 102 (“‘Consent’ should be defined so that no means no.”).
21. Id. at 103.
22. Id. at 96 (“To use resistance as a substitute for intent unnecessarily and unfairly immunizes 
those men whose victims are afraid enough, or intimidated enough, or frankly smart enough not to take 
the risk of resisting physically.”).
23. Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force 
and the Absence of Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1804 (1992) [hereinafter Dripps, Beyond Rape] 
(“[T]he intent that matters should be the intent to engage in sex with a person who says she refuses.”).
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The trouble with the No Model is that it cannot account for the ways 
victims frequently react to sexual trauma. Like Adrienne, many respond 
with mental dissociation and physical paralysis. Just as the trauma of the 
situation can obliterate the power to resist physically, it can obliterate the 
ability to say “no.” Adrienne did not physically resist or verbally express 
her refusal to Mike’s sexual advances. He penetrated her while she 
remained profoundly passive, a mental runaway from pain she could not 
bear. Under the No Model, she thereby consented.
Under the Yes Model, by contrast, a man must obtain affirmative 
permission from his partner before he penetrates her.24 If the woman does 
not express a “yes” of some kind, the law presumes the woman does not 
consent, and sexual penetration is rape.25
Defenders of the Yes Model make two important points. First, they 
emphasize that a woman’s silence alone cannot mean “yes.”26 This is the 
Yes Model’s attempt to break from both the common law and the No 
Model. Second—and in some tension with the first tenet—they underscore 
that a woman can express a “yes” through her nonverbal behavior.27
Stephen Schulhofer, architect of the Yes Model, argues that engaging in 
“sexual petting,” for example, can express a “yes” to sexual penetration.28
“If she doesn’t say ‘no,’ and if her silence is combined with passionate 
kissing, hugging, and sexual touching, it is usually sensible to infer actual 
willingness.”29 When things heat up, then, the Yes Model melts into the No 
Model, in which silence constitutes consent.
How does the Yes Model interpret what Mike did to Adrienne? Mike 
could not presume consent to penetration from Adrienne’s silence alone, to 
be sure. He had to obtain a “yes” to penetration from her words or 
nonverbal behavior. Because Adrienne never uttered a word, Mike was left 
to parse the tacit implications of her actions. Adrienne snuck out and 
walked three miles to his house late at night to see him. She followed him 
24. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
2151, 2181 (1995) [hereinafter Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge] (“Consent for an intimate physical 
intrusion into the body should mean in sexual interactions what it means in every other context—
affirmative permission clearly signaled by words or conduct.”).
25. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 271 ( “For [sexual] intrusions actual permission—nothing 
less than positive willingness, clearly communicated—should ever count as consent.”).
26. See, e.g., Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge, supra note 24, at 2181 (“Silence and 
ambivalence are not permission.”).
27. See, e.g., id. (“There are many ways to make permission clear without verbalizing the word 
‘yes,’ and permission certainly need not be in writing.”).
28. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 272.
29. Id.
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into his house alone. Although he informed her that his parents were within 
earshot, she did not call out to them. Her clothes came off in an isolated 
room. Her passive silence was combined with his “passionate kissing, 
hugging, and sexual touching.” Could Mike sensibly “infer actual 
willingness”?
At its core, the Yes Model relies on a man’s ability to infer actual 
willingness from a woman’s body language.30 Yet study after study 
indicates that men consistently misinterpret women’s nonverbal behavior.31
They impute erotic innuendo and sexual intent where there is none.32 Any 
theory that relies on a man’s ability to intuit a woman’s actual willingness 
allows him to construct consent out of stereotype and hopeful imagination.
Moreover, the Yes Model assumes consent to sexual petting implies 
consent to sexual penetration. Because unprotected sexual penetration 
spreads sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), including the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS, people often engage in 
petting instead of penetration in order to minimize the potential health 
consequences associated with penetration.33 Even if someone actively 
engages in “passionate kissing, hugging, and sexual touching,” it would 
therefore not be, as Schulhofer claims, “sensible to infer actual 
willingness” to penetration without a verbal objection. If two people are 
engaged in petting and one escalates the situation, mental dissociation and 
frozen fright can occur, paralyzing the victim’s ability to resist or say “no.”
Under the two main proposals for legal reform in rape law, what 
happened to Adrienne and so many others like her was probably just bad 
sex—an unfortunate misunderstanding that could have been avoided only if 
she had done something differently. Maybe she should have told him that 
she only wanted to spend time with him and kiss. Maybe she should have 
emphasized, “I do not want you to interpret my actions as actual permission 
for sexual penetration.” Maybe she should have yelled “no” and awoken 
Mike’s parents or, better yet, kicked him in the shins. Under either the No 
or Yes Model, the onus was on her to say and do more.
The fundamental problem with both the No and Yes Models of rape 
law reform is in the notion of consent itself. Traditionally, sexual consent 
has meant a woman’s passive acquiescence to male sexual initiative. 
Recently, many legal scholars have fought for a “refurbished version of 
30. See id.
31. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 90– 94 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 102–106 and accompanying text.
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consent.”34 If the No and Yes Models are the result of those efforts, it is 
time to give up that fight. Not only must rape law abolish the force and 
resistance requirements, it must abolish the non-consent requirement as 
well.
This article defines and defends a new model of rape law reform. It 
argues that the law should eliminate the requirement of non-consent. In its 
place, the law should recognize the centrality of negotiation, in which a 
person would be required to consult with his or her partner before sexual 
penetration occurs. Negotiation would not require a verbal contract for 
penetration. Instead, it would require only what conscientious and humane 
partners already have: a communicative exchange, before penetration 
occurs, about whether they want to engage in sexual intercourse.
Specifically, the law should define “rape” as engaging in an act of 
sexual penetration with another person when the actor fails to negotiate the 
penetration with the partner before it occurs. The law should define 
“negotiation” as an open discussion in which partners come to a free and 
autonomous agreement about the act of penetration. Negotiations would 
have to be verbal unless the partners had established a context in which 
they could reliably read one another’s nonverbal behavior to indicate free 
and autonomous agreement. Force, coercion, or misrepresentations by the 
actor would be evidence of a failure to negotiate.
The Negotiation Model would protect the values that rape law should 
be designed to protect. It would maximize autonomy and equality and 
minimize coercion and subordination. It would require people to treat their 
sexual partners with respect and humanity.
This Article analyzes the notion of consent and the two main rape 
reform proposals that rely on consent, the No and Yes Models. Part One 
critiques the use of consent to demarcate when sexual penetration is 
legitimate, analyzes the No and the Yes Models, and argues that they come 
with serious disadvantages. Part Two defines a Negotiation Model for rape 
law reform, differentiates it from the other reform models, discusses its 
advantages over them, and addresses its potential disadvantages.
I. Considering Consent
34. Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 777, 814 (1988) (“The feminist critique has prompted a refurbishment, but not an 
abandonment, of the concept of consent in the law of sex.”).
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Both the No and Yes Models of rape law reform are founded on the 
idea of consent. The Oxford English Dictionary defines “consent” as 
“[v]oluntary agreement to or acquiescence in what another proposes or 
desires; compliance, concurrence, permission.”35 In the consent model of 
sexual relations, the man desires and proposes sex and the woman 
voluntarily complies with his desire.
The legal world has concurred with the lay definition. Until 1999, 
Black’s Law Dictionary defined consent as “voluntarily yielding the will to 
the proposition of another; acquiescence or compliance therewith.”36 It 
continued:
As used in the law of rape “consent” means consent of the will, and 
submission under the influence of fear or terror cannot amount to real 
consent. [T]here must be a choice between resistance and assent. And if 
a woman resists to the point where further resistance would be useless or 
until her resistance is overcome by force or violence, submission 
thereafter is not “consent.”37
When facing a sexual advance, therefore, a woman could either physically 
resist or assent. Passive yielding to that sexual advance would constitute 
permission to be acted upon, otherwise known as sexual “consent.”
A number of other areas in which consent is legally meaningful also 
involve permission to be acted upon by others. Consent to be searched 
under the Fourth Amendment, for example, means that a suspect 
voluntarily grants police or other governmental agents permission to search 
her person or effects. Informed medical consent means a patient grants a 
doctor permission to conduct a medical procedure upon her body. Consent, 
therefore is permission to be acted upon in some way. By itself, it suggests 
a passive response to the actions of another. To the extent that it indicates a 
“concurrence of wills,”38 it does so through one’s voluntarily submission to 
the will of another.
A model for heterosexuality is thereby constructed. Men are active 
agents. Women are passive receptacles of male agency.39 Men initiate 
35. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 760 (2d ed. 1989).
36. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990). In 1999, Black’s Law Dictionary changed the 
definition of consent to “agreement, approval, or permission as to some act or purpose, esp. given 
voluntarily by a competent person.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 300 (7th ed. 1999). That definition 
remains in force in the current edition as well. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (8th ed. 2004). 
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990).
38. Id.
39. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 177 (1989) 
(“[W]omen are socialized to passive receptivity . . . .”). See also Henderson, supra note 17, at 42 
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sexuality; women surrender to male sexual initiation.40 He wills a sexual 
act to happen; she willingly submits to his desire. “Man proposes, woman 
disposes. Even the ideal . . . is not mutual.”41 Only if she physically resists, 
says “no,” or fails to display her compliance with his actions might the law 
deem the sexual penetration rape.
The No and Yes Models do not reject the passive acquiescence 
inherent in the notion of consent. Under the No Model, a man may sexually 
penetrate a woman as long as he does not employ force to do so, and she
does not physically resist or say “no.” Advocates for the No Model argue 
that it would prevent sexual expropriation. Under the Yes Model, a man 
may not sexually penetrate a woman unless he obtains affirmative 
permission from her words or conduct. Advocates for the Yes Model argue 
that it would protect sexual autonomy. Based on how proponents have 
described these models in their scholarship, however, each replicates 
archaic gender norms from the common law and fails to prevent sexual 
expropriation or protect sexual autonomy.
A. THE NO MODEL
Susan Estrich advances the No Model of rape law reform in her 1987 
book, Real Rape. In it, she dismantles the underlying wrongs of the 
common law of rape, analyzes the continued influence of the common law 
on modern rape statutes, and offers a set of “new answers.”42 Her central 
thesis is, “‘Consent’ should be defined so that no means no.”43 Rape law 
should focus on “the man’s blameworthiness instead of the woman’s.”44
She argues for a standard of criminal negligence in rape liability, and 
argues that proceeding to penetrate someone in the face of a “no” is 
criminally negligent behavior.45 She explains:
As for intent, unreasonableness as to consent, understood to mean 
ignoring a woman’s words, should be sufficient for liability. Reasonable 
men should be held to know that no means no; and unreasonable 
mistakes, no matter how honestly claimed, should not exculpate. Thus, 
(“A[n] . . . influential cultural belief is that female submission to male sexual dominance or aggression 
is natural, romantic, and erotic.”).
40. Carole Pateman, Women and Consent, 8 POL. THEORY 149, 164 (1980) (“The ‘naturally’ 
superior, active, and sexually aggressive male makes an initiative, or offers a contract, to which a 
‘naturally’ subordinate, passive woman ‘consents.’”).
41. MACKINNON, supra note 39, at 174.
42. ESTRICH, supra note 9, at 92 & passim.
43. Id. at 102.
44. Id. at 96.
45. Id. at 97–100.
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the threshold of liability—whether phrased in terms of “consent,” 
“force,” and “coercion” or some combination of the three—should be 
understood to include at least those nontraditional rapes where the 
woman says no or submits only in response to lies or threats which 
would be prohibited were money sought instead.46
In a 1992 essay, Donald Dripps delineates an updated version of the 
No Model.47 Dripps advocates criminalizing two distinct sexual offenses. 
The first he calls “sexually motivated assault,” which he defines as 
“purposely or knowingly giv[ing] another person cause to fear physical 
injury, or purposely or knowingly inflict[ing] physical injury on another 
person, or purposely or knowingly overpower[ing] another’s physical 
resistance, for the purpose of causing any person to engage in a sexual 
act.”48 Sexually motivated assault is similar to common law rape; it 
requires force, the threat of force, or overpowering a victim’s resistance to 
obtain sexual penetration.49
The second crime is a misdemeanor or minor felony Dripps calls 
“sexual expropriation.” He defines it as sexual penetration with any person 
unconscious or “known by the actor to have expressed refusal to engage in 
that act, without subsequently expressly revoking that refusal.”50 Dripps 
describes this crime as the “nonviolent” taking of another person’s body for 
sexual purposes.51
As for the intent required for sexual expropriation, Dripps explains:
The substantive law ought to punish the disregard of the sexual object’s 
words, without regard to their sincerity. Specific intent should remain the 
standard; but the intent that matters should be the intent to engage in sex 
with a person who says she refuses.52
This passage echoes Estrich’s analysis of intent. Dripps and Estrich 
italicize the same word when emphasizing the circumstances in which 
46. Id. at 103.
47. Dripps, Beyond Rape, supra note 23, at 1807. Although Dripps argues that, under his 
proposal, “consent to sex” would be “taken out of the law,” id. at 1805–06, his proposal in practice 
simply defines non-consent as physical or verbal resistance from the victim.
48. Id. at 1807.
49. Sexually motivated assault subjects the defendant to the same sentence as aggravated assault, 
unless it involves a deadly weapon, dismemberment or disfigurement, in which case it subjects one to 
the sentence previously associated with rape. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1800. Sexual expropriation is a misdemeanor or minor felony punishable by the 
maximum of a year and a day. Id. at 1807.
52. Id. at 1804. Lynne Henderson argues for a strong No Model under which the law would 
“impose strict liability as soon as the woman says no or indicates that she does not want to engage in 
sexual activity.” Henderson, supra note 17, at 68.
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nonconsensual sex should be criminal: against a woman who says she 
refuses. The No Model thereby attaches great importance to the victim’s 
words of sexual refusal. Unless the defendant employs force or the victim 
is unconscious or mentally incompetent, a victim has to express her refusal 
before a sexual act is criminal.
Dripps is confident that “[t]he partners will have time to object to sex 
acts they don’t like, typically before those acts occur, and in any event 
immediately upon their initiation.”53 He emphasizes:
Women are expected to object when male advances exceed female 
preference. Unless a man either exploits an unconscious or incompetent 
victim, or induces a woman’s acquiescence by violence or some other 
wrongful pressure, this doesn’t seem like so much to ask.54
A verbal imperative is, therefore, on the victim. Women who are 
about to be penetrated either have to resist physically or to express their 
unwillingness verbally, or the penetration will not be deemed against their 
will. Under the No Model, therefore, sexual penetration is legal unless the 
woman physically or verbally opposes it.
B. THE YES MODEL
Unlike the No Model, under the Yes Model sexual penetration is 
illegal unless one’s partner physically or verbally grants permission for it.55
In a series of law review articles culminating in his 1998 book, Unwanted 
Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law, Stephen 
Schulhofer advances the Yes Model of rape law.56 Like Dripps, Schulhofer 
advocates two separate sexual offenses. The first, a second-degree felony 
he calls “rape”57 or “sexual assault,”58 criminalizes the use of “physical 
force to compel another person to submit to an act of sexual penetration.”59
53. Panel Discussion, Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 146 (1994) 
[hereinafter Panel Discussion].
54. Id.
55. A 1993 comment by Lani Anne Remick in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review first 
advanced the Yes Model. Under this model, the lack of verbal permission should raise a presumption of 
non-consent, but the defendant may rebut this presumption by proving consent beyond a reasonable 
doubt based on the complainant’s nonverbal behavior. Lani Anne Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: 
An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (1993). Remick’s 
burden-shifting proposal may not have persuaded other scholars, but her position that one must obtain 
either verbal or nonverbal consent to sexual penetration did.
56. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17.
57. Id. at 105.
58. Id. at 283
59. Id.
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This offense is analogous to Dripps’s sexually motivated assault and 
common law rape.
The second crime, a third-degree felony he calls “sexual abuse,” 
criminalizes “an act of sexual penetration with another person, when he
knows that he does not have the consent of the other person.”60 He defines 
consent as “actual words or conduct indicating affirmative, freely given 
permission to the act of sexual penetration.”61 Schulhofer calls sexual 
abuse a “nonviolent interference with sexual autonomy.”62 This crime is 
analogous to Dripps’s sexual expropriation. Both scholars conceptualize 
sex without consent as “nonviolent.”
Schulhofer criticizes the No Model in its treatment of the passive or 
silent woman. He notes:
[H]er failure to protest in these circumstances might mean willingness. 
But it could just as well mean disorientation or fear. The assumption that 
silence means actual willingness is clearly untenable. And the 
assumption that it is fair to treat her as if she had consented simply 
ignores all the situational factors that might leave her unable to think 
clearly, act quickly, or speak forcefully at the crucial moment.63
As a result, Schulhofer advocates a requirement of actual permission to 
protect a person’s sexual autonomy to be free from unwanted penetration. 
He explains:
A defendant could be convicted only if he knew he did not have the 
woman’s affirmative permission or if he was criminally negligent in 
thinking that he did. But silence, ambiguous behavior, and the absence of 
clearly expressed unwillingness are evidence that affirmative consent 
was absent; they should no longer suggest, as they do in present law, that 
a defendant did nothing wrong in forging ahead to intercourse.64
Unlike the No Model, the Yes Model does not appear, at first blush, to 
demand that the potential victim of a sexual assault speak. Nor must the 
potential defendant speak. Schulhofer rejects the imposition of a verbal 
permission requirement. He assures his readers:
[A] verbal-yes rule is not mandated by a commitment to respect sexual 
autonomy. The central point is that sexual intimacy must be chosen 
freely. The first priorities are to stop insisting on proof of the woman’s 
60. Id. Schulhofer also allows recklessness or criminal negligence to establish the mens rea of 
the crime, even though negligence moves the grading of the crime down a degree. Id. at 284.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 105.
63. Id. at 269.
64. Id. at 271.
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opposition and to stop requiring her to take actions clear enough to 
overcome the law’s presumption that she is always interested in sex—at 
any time, in any place, with any person. The legal standard must move 
away from the demand [under the No Model] for unambiguous evidence 
of her protests and insist instead that the man have affirmative 
indications that she chose to participate. So long as a person’s choice is 
clearly expressed, by words or conduct, her right to control her sexuality 
is respected.65
In terms of the kind of “conduct” that should establish actual permission, 
Schulhofer notes:
Only unambiguous body language should suffice to signal affirmative 
consent, of course. Sexual petting does not in itself imply permission for 
intercourse, any more than does inviting a man in for coffee or 
permitting him to pay for dinner. A woman who engages in intense 
sexual foreplay should always retain the right to say “no.”66
So what kind of “unambiguous body language” should “suffice to signal 
affirmative consent”? Schulhofer’s next sentence provides one example: “If 
she doesn’t say ‘no,’ and if her silence is combined with passionate kissing, 
hugging, and sexual touching, it is usually sensible to infer actual 
willingness.”67
This analysis, however, is straight from the No Model. If she is silent 
and fails to say “no,” one may presume she consents to penetration. What 
happened to “actual permission” for penetration? Passionate kissing, 
hugging, and sexual touching supply it. Once she engages in kissing and 
petting, the No Model supplants the Yes Model and verbal resistance is 
again required.
As one scholar describes Schulhofer’s notion of nonverbal consent, 
“While verbal permission will certainly do, so will cheerfully following 
someone into a bedroom and taking off one’s clothes.”68 Another scholar 
concurs: “A woman who after being propositioned, walks into her host’s 
bedroom and disrobes, may not have given verbal consent. But she has 
‘affirmatively’ manifested her intentions, and that should suffice.”69 The 
65. Id. at 272–73.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Alan Wertheimer, What Is Consent? And Is It Important?, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 574 
(2000).
69. David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 398 (2000).
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Yes Model, therefore, divines consent to sexual penetration from disrobing 
and sexual touch.
It is useful at this point to compare and contrast the No and Yes 
Models. The No Model purports to focus on the defendant’s mens rea but 
requires no action or words from him. Instead, it demands physical or 
verbal resistance from her to supply the defendant with notice of the 
victim’s actual refusal. Absent such notice, the defendant may penetrate
her.
The Yes Model purports to focus on the victim’s sexual autonomy but 
it also requires no actions or words from the defendant. The Yes Model 
rejects a requirement of verbal discourse between the partners in favor of 
allowing the man to interpret the woman’s body language to supply him 
with permission. Under both models, then, “no” means no penetration. 
Under both models, a person’s willingness to engage in other sexual 
contact, absent a “no,” signals “yes” to penetration. Both models of rape 
law reform are substantially better than the law in most states. 
Unfortunately, neither fully justifies itself or fulfills its promise to prevent 
sexual expropriation or protect sexual autonomy.
C. OBJECTIONS TO CONSENT
There are three main objections to the No and Yes Models of rape law 
reform. First, victims’ lived experiences are inconsistent with both models. 
Second, men misinterpret female nonverbal behavior as indicative of 
consent, which undermines both models. Third, allowing consent to sexual 
penetration based on consent to heavy petting, which the Yes Model does, 
is inconsistent with sexual autonomy and health, particularly in an age of 
HIV.
1. Victims’ Trauma
Psychologists have conducted an extensive amount of research 
regarding the effects of trauma on human psychology and physiology. Most 
trauma research related to rape victims focuses on Post Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (“PTSD”), a debilitating condition that occurs after the victim 
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suffers a traumatic stressor event.70 Nearly one-third of rape victims 
develop PTSD.71
More relevant to this article, however, are the various psychological 
and physiological reactions that individuals experience during a traumatic 
stressor event itself, their peritraumatic responses. One common reaction to 
the extreme stress of sexual assault is the deer-in-headlights effect.72 Like 
other mammals, humans often respond to trauma with peritraumatic 
paralysis.73 One study found that eighty-eight percent of victims of 
childhood sexual assault and seventy -five percent of victims of adult sexual 
assault experienced moderate or high levels of paralysis during the 
assault.74
A second common response to sexual trauma is an alteration in 
awareness, called peritraumatic dissociation.75 A victim’s nervous system 
can become overwhelmed as it undergoes great emotional distress.76
During such an episode, she may dissociate from her body as an adaptive 
means to escape damaging sensory input.77 As Judith Herman, clinical 
professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and leading scholar in
the field of trauma research, explains:
The person may feel as though the event is not happening to her, as
though she is observing from outside her body, or as though the whole 
experience is a bad dream from which she will shortly awaken. These 
perceptual changes combine with a feeling of indifference, emotional 
70. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 463 (4th ed. 2000). Symptoms of PTSD include hyperarousal (e.g., irritability or an 
exaggerated startle response), avoidance (e.g., social withdrawal or emotional numbing), and intrusion 
(e.g., recurrent thoughts, nightmares, or flashbacks). Id.
71. RAPE IN AMERICA, supra note 5, at 7.
72. In one study of college date rapes, the researcher chose to exclude a number of cases because 
the women were “literally immobilized with fear” and therefore could not communicate their non-
consent. While the women in these situations were petrified, “the[] men were viewing themselves as 
successful seducers . . . .” Eugene J. Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Victims, 9 
VICTIMOLOGY 95, 97 (1984).
73. Gail Abarbanel & Gloria Richman, The Rape Victim, in CRISIS INTERVENTION, BOOK 2: THE 
PRACTITIONER’S SOURCEBOOK FOR BRIEF THERAPY 93, 99–100 (Howard J. Parad & Libbie G. Parad 
eds., 1990). See also Sarah E. Ullman & Raymond A. Knight, Women’s Resistance Strategies to 
Different Rapist Types, 22 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 263, 280 (1995).
74. Robert Finn, Paralysis Common Among Sexual Assault Victims, FAM. PRAC. NEWS, Mar. 1, 
2003, at 44.
75. RON ACIERNO, PH.D., NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION RESEARCH 
CENTER, MEASURING THE MENTAL HEALTH IMPACT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (2000)  
http://www.musc.edu/vawprevention/research/measuring.shtml (last visited May 30, 2005).
76. Id.
77. See John Briere & Marsha Runtz, Post Sexual Abuse Trauma, in LASTING EFFECTS OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE 85 (Gail Elizabeth Wyatt & Gloria Johnson Powell eds., 1988).
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detachment, and profound passivity in which the person relinquishes all 
initiative and struggle. This altered state of consciousness might be 
regarded as one of nature’s small mercies, a protection against 
unbearable pain.78
Symptoms of peritraumatic dissociation include confusion, time 
distortion,79 and “depersonalization,” or the “feeling of detachment from 
and being an outside observer of one’s mental processes or body, or feeling 
like an automaton or as if in a dream.”80 Memory may be lost and pain 
thereby ignored.81 Trauma-related amnesia often occurs.82
Adrienne’s description of her rape (“I just completely left my body.”) 
and her later attempts in therapy to overcome her amnesia and recall the 
forgotten details of the rape (“I just get VERY dizzy, feel like I am floating 
out of my body, and experience sheer panic.”) are both consistent with 
peritraumatic dissociation.
Like physical paralysis, dissociation is a common reaction to sexual 
trauma.83 In one study, nearly nineteen percent of rape victims exhibited 
high peritraumatic dissociation scores.84 In another study of 234 female 
rape survivors who sought treatment, eighty-three percent experienced a 
sense of time distortion during the rape.85 Seventy-two percent indicated 
that the experience seemed unreal, as if they were in a dream or watching a 
movie, and fifty-nine percent felt disconnected from their bodies or 
78. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, M.D., TRAUMA AND RECOVERY: THE AFTERMATH OF VIOLENCE—
FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE TO POLITICAL TERROR 43 (1992).
79. See id.
80. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 70, at 530.
81. DISSOCIATION: CULTURE, MIND, AND BODY IX (David Spiegel, M.D. ed., 1994).
82. Such amnesia develops this way:
 Often, a traumatized person cannot generate the kind of narrative memory that we can 
normally muster for an important experience. Their memories are often fragmented, out of 
sequence, and filled with gaps. They may recall very specific details for particular aspects of 
the experience, and recall little or nothing for others.
David Lisak, The Nerobiology of Trauma, in UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE JUDICIAL 
RESPONSE TO STRANGER AND NONSTRANGER RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT Tab 3, at 2 (1994).
83. Paula K. Lundberg-Love, The Resilience of the Human Psyche: Recognition and Treatment 
of the Adult Survivor of Incest, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION 7 (Michele Antoinette 
Paludi, ed.., 1999).
84. Michael G. Griffin, Ph.D., Patricia A. Resick, Ph.D. & Mindy B. Mechanic, Ph.D., Objective 
Assessment of Peritraumatic Dissociation: Psychophysiological Indicators, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1081, 1083 (1997).
85. Miranda K. Morris, Rape Victims’ Peritraumatic Responses: An Examination of Their
Relationship to One Another, Within-Assault Variables, and Early Victimization 70 (2001) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri-St. Louis) (on file with author). Because the 
sample consisted of victims who sought treatment and excluded those who were suicidal, psychotic, or 
alcohol- or drug-dependent, the study’s findings may not generalize to all rape victims. Id. at 47.
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experienced other somatic distortions.86 Forty-six percent experienced 
moments of blanking out or feeling they were not part of the experience, 
and thirty-eight percent felt as if they were a spectator or were floating 
above the scene.87
The No Model does not and cannot protect victims who suffer from 
peritraumatic paralysis or dissociation. A victim who has these common 
reactions is often cut off from her voice—either she is too shocked to speak
or she has left her body entirely. Once the Yes Model collapses into the No 
Model, when individuals engage in kissing and petting, it suffers from the 
same deficiency.
2. Male Misinterpretation
A well-developed body of social psychology literature documents that 
men interpret women’s body language as indicative of sexual intent when 
women have no such intent.88 Employing numerous methodologies, 
scientists have concluded that this male perceptual error “transcends the 
method used to study it.”89 Men are more likely to misinterpret a woman’s 
consumption of alcohol as conveying sexual intent.90 Men misinterpret 
women’s friendly body language as indicative of sexual intent.91 When 
assessing interpersonal distance, eye contact, and casual touch, men rate 
women as more seductive and more promiscuous than women rate other 
women and themselves.92 Men are more prone to interpret flirting as 
indicative of sexual intent, whereas women tend to view flirting as 
“relational development.”93 In short, the literature documents the male
tendency to see female sexual consent where there is none.
86. Id. at 69, 70.
87. Id. at 69.
88. See Martie G. Haselton & David M. Buss, Error Management Theory: A New Perspective on 
Bias in Cross-Sex Mind Reading, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 81 passim (2000).
89. Id. (“Men’s sexual overperception has been reported by women in surveys of naturally 
occurring events and has been documented using a wide variety of methodologies, including laboratory 
studies of interactions between newly acquainted men and women, studies using photos and films as 
stimuli, and studies . . . using hypothetical scenarios.”) (citation omitted). Men misinterpret women’s 
sexual intent in terms of both their own overperceptions and women’s self-perceived sexual intent. Id. 
at 88.
90. Antonia Abbey & Richard J. Harnish, Perception of Sexual Intent: The Role of Gender, 
Alcohol Consumption, and Rape Supportive Attitudes, 32 SEX ROLES 297, 310 (1995).
91. Antonia Abbey, Sex Differences in Attributions for Friendly Behavior: Do Males 
Misperceive Females’ Friendliness?, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 830, 836 (1982).
92. Antonia Abbey & Christian Melby, The Effects of Nonverbal Cues on Gender Differences in 
Perceptions of Sexual Intent, 15 SEX ROLES 283, 295–96 (1986).
93. David Dryden Henningsen, Flirting with Meaning: An Examination of Miscommunication in 
Flirting Interactions, 50 SEX ROLES 481, 487–88 (2004).
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Male misinterpretation leans only in one direction. Men do not tend to 
think women have no sexual intent when, in fact, they do. Many men, of 
course, resist the propensity to misinterpret in favor of consent. Men who 
teach college students about rape, for example, explain what interpreting 
female body language means in practice:
We have learned . . . to “read” body language, a too often self-fulfilling 
prophesy that invites us to hear and see only what we want to. How 
many of us think we can read our partners’ body language as 
confirmation of their desire for sexual contact and their (implied?) 
agreement with what we have in mind? Using body language this way is 
a sham; we’re merely justifying self-deception or pretending that we’ve 
established more than mere acquiescence or submission.94
Such an interpretive fallacy facilitates rape. Men who believe 
stereotypes about rape, such as “women who wear short skirts are asking 
for it,” are particularly likely to misinterpret women’s nonverbal cues as 
signs of sexual interest.95 Studies indicate:
A man high in rape myth acceptance is more likely than other men to 
assume that a female companion who dresses up or kisses him has 
conveyed her interest in engaging in sexual intercourse. And once he has 
decided that she has expressed interest in sexual relations, a man high in 
rape myth acceptance will feel justified in forcing sex even if his 
companion refuses.96
Legal scholars routinely label male misinterpretation of women’s 
body language as “miscommunication,”97 which suggests that the 
phenomenon is inevitable because of the natural limits of human 
understanding. As Schulhofer argues:
Sexual communication is so often indirect and contradictory that it is a 
wonder mistakes do not occur more often. What seems certain is that 
miscommunication about sexual desires is entirely commonplace. If we 
consider actual behavior of real people in our world as it stands, mistakes 
about consent, including mistakes about the meaning of “no,” are 
undoubt edly frequent.98
94. Joseph Weinberg & Michael Biernbaum, Conversations of Consent: Sexual Intimacy without 
Sexual Assault, in TRANSFORMING A RAPE CULTURE 93 (Emilie Buchwald, Pamela R. Fletcher & 
Martha Roth eds., 1993).
95. Abbey & Harnish, supra note 90, at 309.
96. Id.  (citation omitted).
97. See, e.g., DAVID ARCHARD, SEXUAL CONSENT 34 (1998) (discussing “cross-gender 
miscommunication”); Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U.L. REV. 663, 689 (1999) 
(discussing an “alarming level of miscommunication”); SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 6 5 (discussing 
“miscommunication about sexual desires”).
98. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 65.
CLEAN EDIT
2005] NEGOTIATING SEX 119
The “miscommunication” label suggests that the one sending the cues is as 
deficient as the one receiving them. It also suggests that each party, female 
and male, is trying to communicate an idea that the other misunderstands. 
In fact, however, women interpret men’s body language and sexual intent 
toward them “with reasonable accuracy.”99 Men, by contrast, misinterpret 
women’s body language and infer sexual intent where there is none.
The No Model ignores male misinterpretation of female body 
language because it places the burden of stopping sexual penetration on the 
woman and assumes she can object whenever she wants. The Yes Model, 
though not ignoring the problem, does not attempt to solve it. Schulhofer 
concedes, as he must, that under the Yes Model, “Because ‘body language’ 
can still count as an expression of consent, this approach (for better or 
worse) doesn’t eliminate all the uncertainties of sexual communication.” 
But he notes happily, “A world without ambiguity in erotic interaction 
might be a very dull place, after all.”100
So what happens when there is “ambiguity in erotic interaction”? 
What happens under the Yes Model when a juror assessing such a case is 
not sure? Schulhofer answers that question with resort to the victim’s
verbal and physical resistance:
[R]esistance will still be relevant, in some cases, to determining whether 
consent was given at all. A couple sits side by side necking on a sofa. 
While kissing his date, the man presses his body forward, so that the 
woman is pushed back to a reclining position. He then reaches under her 
dress to touch her genital area. The women might or might not be 
consenting to these sexual contacts. If she says “no,” tries to sit up, and 
pushes his hands away, we are more likely to think she is unwilling than 
if she does none of these things. Resistance remains relevant when we 
are not sure whether the woman gave consent.101
Notice that here again the Yes Model collapses into the No Model once the 
man’s sexual initiatives begin.
Under the No Model, a man may misinterpret a woman’s body 
language to mean consent to sexual penetration. He has permission to 
penetrate her until she objects. Under the Yes Model, a man may also 
misinterpret a woman’s body language to mean consent to sexual
99. Haselton & Buss, supra note 88, at 89.
100. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at  271–72. Schulhofer concludes that requiring men to clarify 
sexual ambiguity by verbal discourse is beyond what courts would be willing to do: “The verbal-yes 
rule may be worth its costs, but it seems many steps beyond the level of regulation that contemporary 
courts are likely to entertain.” Id. at 272.
101. Id. at 131.
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penetration when there is kissing, hugging, and petting involved. He may 
then penetrate her until she objects.
Both models reward willful blindness. Without a requirement of 
verbal discourse placed on the defendant, each allows the defendant to 
avoid knowing whether his partner wanted to be penetrated. Unless his 
partner verbally objects, a man who deliberately avoids guilty knowledge 
by quietly and quickly penetrating a woman he is passionately kissing is a 
man with consent. Once one understands how sexual trauma can manifest 
itself as physical paralysis and mental dissociation, this position is no 
longer tenable.
3. Petting, Penetration, and AIDS
Because of the threat that HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases 
pose, many people are choosing to engage in sexual behavior that does not 
include penetration, particularly when they are enjoying casual sexual 
intimacy or sexual intimacy with a relatively new partner.102 Young people, 
for instance, are engaging in more sexual petting and fellatio as a substitute 
for vaginal intercourse.103 They often engage in fondling, fantasy role-
playing, and fellatio under the belief that these practices maintain technical 
virginity, avoid pregnancy, and constitute safe sex.104 The more diverse 
sexual experiences people participate in—experiences that deliberately do 
not include vaginal or anal penetration—the less those experiences suggest 
consent to vaginal or anal penetration. Now, more than ever, sexual 
penetration is a specific act that sexually active people negotiate.
Under the No Model, a man may assume that consent to sexual petting 
means consent to sexual penetration because he may assume consent unless 
he hears otherwise. He has permission to penetrate her unless she objects.
Under the Yes Model, a man may assume consent to sexual petting 
means consent to sexual penetration because, as Schulhofer says, “If she 
doesn’t say ‘no,’ and if her silence is combined with passionate kissing, 
hugging, and sexual touching, it is usually sensible to infer actual 
102. Alex Williams, Casual Relationships, Yes. Casual Sex, Not Really, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, at 9.1(“The courtship rites of this generation of urban singles seem to borrow from 
the mores of their grandmothers in the 1950’s (date lots of boys; smooch, spoon, nuzzle or neck to your 
heart’s content, but hold out for that pledge pin from Mr. Right)”). See also id. (“‘We’ve had so much 
sex ed,’ [one woman] said. ‘With strangers, we are really cautious of the disease thing.’”).
103. Israel M. Schwartz, Sexual Activity Prior To Coital Initiation: A Comparison Between Males 
and Females, 28 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 63, 68 (1999).
104. Lisa Remez, Oral Sex Among Adolescents: Is It Sex or Is It Abstinence?, 32 FAM. PLAN. 
PERSP. 298, 298– 301 (2000).
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willingness.”105 The Yes Model divines consent to sexual penetration from 
disrobing and sexual touch. “[C]heerfully following someone into a 
bedroom and taking off one’s clothes,”106 however, indicates only that one 
wants to be naked with someone else. The Yes Model assumes that a 
woman consents to sexual penetration if she engages in heavy petting, 
when in fact she may be engaging in heavy petting in order to avoid 
penetration and the risks associated with it. The No and Yes Models, 
therefore, are inconsistent with sexual autonomy and sexual health, 
particularly in an age of HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases.
II. CONSIDERING NEGOTIATION
This section offers a new model of rape law reform based on 
negotiation. It describes the Negotiation Model, applies it in different 
contexts, and analyzes potential objections to it.
A. THE NEGOTIATION MODEL
The Negotiation Model requires consultation, reciprocal 
communication, and the exchange of views before a person initiates sexual 
penetration. It requires communication that is verbal unless partners have 
established a context between them in which they may accurately assess 
one another’s nonverbal behavior. The verbal communication must be such 
as would indicate to a reasonable person that sexual penetration has been 
freely and explicitly agreed to. The distinction between negotiation and 
consent is more than semantic.
1. Negotiated Process
The Oxford English Dictionary defines “negotiate” as “[t]o hold 
communication or conference (with another) for the purpose of arranging 
some matter by mutual agreement.”107 The lay definition of “negotiate,” 
therefore, suggests not the granting of permission for the actions of another 
(as “consent” does), but an active consultation with someone else to come 
to a mutual agreement. The legal world concurs with the lay definition. 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “negotiate” as “to communicate with 
another party for the purpose of reaching an understanding.”108 Instead of 
105. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 272.
106. Wertheimer, supra note 68, at 574.
107. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 303 (2d ed. 1989).
108. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1064 (8th ed. 2004). By adopting a model of criminal law 
reform based on negotiation, I do not mean to import other aspects of negotiation as practiced in 
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getting a woman to “voluntarily yield[] [her] will” to his sexual 
proposition,109 a man should have to “communicate or confer with [his
partner] so as to arrive at the settlement of [the] matter.”110 Instead of 
obtaining “acquiescence” or “compliance,”111 one should have to “arrive 
through discussion at some kind of agreement” with his partner about 
whether sexual penetration should occur.112 Partners should have to 
communicate with one another to discern each other’s desires and 
limitations before sexual penetration occurs.
In contrast to consent, in which a woman allows a man to act upon 
her, negotiation requires persons (of whatever sex) who want to initiate 
penetration to engage their partners actively in a decision-making process 
before penetration occurs. The Negotiation Model would require that 
partners negotiate only penetrative acts, not each potentially romantic 
act.113 Procedurally, negotiation requires consultation before penetration, 
which consent does not require. Although consent may include meaningful 
consultation and agreement, legally it is broad enough to include 
permission by default, submission out of fear, and acquiescence by virtue 
of a fait accompli rather than by joint communication. A negotiated 
agreement, by contrast, is a concurrence of the wills through mutual 
consideration and reciprocity of concern.
Recall that consent suggests a woman’s allowance or permission for 
a man’s sexual actions upon her. In essence, consent means, “She let him.” 
Under the No Model, for example, “she let him” do anything to which she 
did not verbally or physically object. Under the Yes Model, “she let him” 
do anything he believed she gave him verbal or nonverbal permission to do. 
The legal question under both models thereby becomes, “What did she let 
him do?”
Instead of asking, “What did she let him do?” the Negotiation Model 
asks, “Did the person who initiated sexual penetration negotiate with his or 
mediation and other alternative dispute resolution processes into the sexual relationship. For example, 
the Negotiation Model does not assume that partners are in an adversarial relationship with one another. 
The Negotiation Model also does not assume that partners will compromise in what they choose to do 
or that compromise is an appropriate goal in a sexual negotiation. Because of the serious importance of 
sexual autonomy, the person who wants the least amount of sexual intimacy should always be able to 
limit its level.
109. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 305 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “consent”).
110. Id. at 1036 (defining “negotiate”).
111. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 760 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “consent”).
112. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1036 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “negotiate”).
113. Requiring consent for each potentially romantic act was a policy adopted in 1990 by Antioch 
College and subsequently ridiculed in the media. PEGGY REEVES SANDAY, A WOMAN SCORNED: 
ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 272–77 (1996).
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her partner and thereby come to an agreement that sexual penetration 
should occur?” As a model, it seeks to maximize the opportunity for sexual 
partners to share intentions, desires, and boundaries. Negotiation manifests 
itself as mutual consultation and the expression of preferences. It ideally 
involves a discussion of the partners’ tastes and an agreement to engage in 
mutually desired behaviors.
Alas, sexual penetration does not always happen ideally. The law 
cannot and should not criminalize all less than ideal penetration. Humans 
will at times choose to engage in sex for distasteful and sometimes odious 
reasons. The law cannot do anything about those who agree to unpleasant 
penetration from their husbands because they imagine it is their “wifely 
duty.”114 It cannot help a seventeen-year-old who agrees to sexual 
penetration that he does not desire because he hopes it will prove he is a 
man. The law cannot do anything about a young woman who agrees to 
dangerous, unprotected penetration in order to impress her friends. It 
cannot do anything for a person who, having suffered chronic sexual abuse 
as a child, comes to think of himself as his perpetrators thought of him, and 
so seeks to engage in degrading sexual acts.
The Negotiation Model does not mandate the content of sexual 
inter actions, only the process by which persons agree to penetration. When 
one wants to engage in penetration, negotiation would minimally require a 
request for information about another person’s desires and boundaries or an 
expression of one’s own with an invitation to respond. Asking partners for 
their preferences gives them an opportunity to open or set the boundaries 
for a sexual interaction. This communication expresses an interest in the 
other person’s perspective. It requests an interchange, an exchange of ideas. 
It is a conversation starter that expresses a willingness to consider the other 
person’s inclinations and humanity. It expresses that the other person 
matters.
Negotiation as a process, therefore, involves an exchange of ideas 
between people. It does not assume that the male will initiate and the 
female will either acquiesce or object to what he wants. Unlike the 
traditional notion of consent, negotiation assumes reciprocal 
responsibilities between partners and equal authority to direct the sexual 
interaction, whatever the partners’ genders and sexual orientation.
114. Kathleen C. Basile, Rape by Acquiescence, 5 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1036, 1046–47 
(1999) (discussing a “perceived wifely duty” as a reason why some married women submit to unwanted 
sex).
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The Negotiation Model is gender-neutral and does not assume 
heterosexuality. Both men and women may be guilty of raping either their 
male or female partners under this model. For example, a woman is liable 
for rape if she engages in sexual penetration without negotiating the act 
with her partner beforehand.
Sometimes people come to sexual interactions with a clear set of 
preferences about what they want to do. Other times, they have no set 
preferences but are open to exploration. A negotiated process is appropriate 
in both circumstances. For example, a girl may be willing to engage in 
fellatio but unwilling to engage in vaginal sex because she wants to 
preserve her technical virginity. Her boyfriend may say, “I want to have 
sex with you. Do you want that, too?” She may respond, “I’ll go down on 
you, but that’s all, because I want to save myself for marriage.”
A woman may not be sure whether she wants to engage in penetration 
with her girlfriend, but may be open to the possibilities as they evolve 
during a romantic interlude. She might say, “I’m not really sure what I 
want to do, but I want to just go with the flow and see what feels good at 
the time. Would that be cool with you?” Her partner may respond, 
“Actually, I want to take it slow. I’m not really into having sex . . . but I’d
love to make out.”
The minimally required negotiation for penetrative acts needs to be 
specific, but it need not be formal. People rarely say anything like, “I agree 
to have vaginal sex with you. Let us now proceed.” Instead, they say things 
like, “Kissing you is making me so hot. I want you to be inside me. Do you 
want that, too?” Though informal, this communication does all the work 
that negotiation requires. It states a desire and asks the other person for 
their position, providing the opportunity to express anything from mutual 
longing to aversion.
Silence would never be adequate to constitute a negotiation. A wink 
and nudge would not constitute one either. Meeting at a party, drinking 
alcohol, and making out would not constitute a negotiation for sexual 
penetration. Instead, partners would have to engage in a communicative 
process—a verbal discussion about what they wanted to do with one 
another—before penetration occurred.
2. Agreement
The Negotiation Model requires more than the communicative process 
of negotiation before sexual penetration. It also requires agreement. 
Agreement does not require a separate communicative process, however. 
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After partners have engaged in a negotiation regarding what they want to 
do together, each partner may assume the other agrees to engage in the 
penetrative acts they discussed fondly with one another. Partners need not 
recite, “I agree to have oral sex with you.” Having expressed their mutual 
preferences is sufficient when the partners engage in what both indicated 
they wanted between them.
Agreement between partners is dynamic and active. Agreements 
change over time, and must be sensitive to context and changed 
circumstance. People can and do change their minds. For example, if two 
men initially agree to engage in penetration with each other and then one of 
them changes his mind and expresses a verbal or physical “no” to it, then 
there is no longer agreement between them, and his partner must 
immediately stop the penetration. Here the Negotiation Model incorporates 
an important part of the No and Yes Models—the importance of verbal 
refusal—but only after the partners have agreed to sexual penetration itself. 
It does not assume penetration is appropriate without consultation.
3. Context for Nonverbal Negotiation
Can negotiation and agreement between two people regarding sexual 
penetration occur nonverbally? In terms of the heterosexual intercourse that 
men initiate, we have seen the risk in relying on men’s ability to interpret 
female body language. Relying on body language creates too many 
possibilities for mistake and is therefore ethically inadequate. When a 
sexual relationship is relatively new, whatever the sexual orientation of 
partners, verbal negotiation is the only principled course of action in an age 
of sexually transmitted diseases, unwanted pregnancy, and widespread 
sexual assault. Particularly when people are engaging in sexual penetration 
for the first time, verbal discourse is a necessity.
Most negotiations regarding specific activities that are to occur in the 
future happen verbally, of course. Language is ordinarily required to clarify 
one’s desires over time; however, an established custom between two 
people of engaging in mutually desired behavior in a certain way may itself 
constitute a negotiation. By repeating the mutually desired activity over 
time, partners may establish a pattern of sexual behavior that makes 
explicit discussions unnecessary.115
115. As Katharine Baker has argued:
Communication based on physical clues and implicit understanding may be a goal worth 
working towards in long term sexually intimate relationships, but it is hardly a goal that we 
should expect people to be able to meet in their first few sexual encounters. First, the evidence 
is clear that there is no implicit understanding between new sexual partners; there is a great 
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After partners establish a pattern of engaging in sexual penetration 
that serves as the necessary negotiation, the Yes Model provides sufficient 
protection for sexual autonomy. Partners may proceed to follow the custom 
between them when they both indicate affirmative nonverbal agreement. A 
longer-term relationship, therefore, provides a context in which partners 
may reliably read one another’s nonverbal behavior. Without a custom, 
however, partners have to negotiate penetration verbally.
Thus, the Negotiation Model acknowledges that the character of 
sexual interactions between partners may change over time as they come to 
know one another’s desires and preferences. Sexual partners may over time 
establish a custom based on the comfort of shared mutuality, thus rendering
verbal negotiations unnecessary.116
It is important to note that the risk for sexual assault is highest for 
people engaging in sexual penetration for the first time. According to a 
recent national crime victimization survey, the victim and the offender had 
not previously been intimate with one another in ninety percent of the rapes 
of females over the age of twelve, and one hundred percent of the rapes of 
males over the age of twelve.117 Most stranger and acquaintance rapes are 
the only sexual interaction the two people will have. Therefore, the 
imperative of verbal negotiation for penetration is all the more powerful in 
newer relationships.
As a result, under the Negotiation Model, if a state charges someone 
with rape, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant initiated and engaged in sexual penetration, and failed to 
negotiate and come to an agreement with his partner about such penetration 
before it occurred. The state would prove failure to negotiate by evidence 
deal of misunderstanding. Second, the misunderstanding results in serious harm to those who 
are less powerful physically. Third, it is wildly utopian to think that the model of 
Male/Aggression—Female/Passivity will ever change unless we talk about how it should 
change.
Baker, supra note 97, at 690. David Archard notes:
[A] loving couple may, over time, have developed a clear understanding of what each party 
sexually wants and is prepared to do. Such an understanding may rely on conventions which 
they, but no others, share. Their relationship is all the better for having these wordless, yet 
conventional understandings of what is agreeable to them both. In the first case strangers can 
explicitly negotiate and agree on sexual conventions; in the second a loving couple gradually 
develop such conventions.
ARCHARD, supra note 97, at 31 –32.
116. This acknowledgment does not re-inscribe the law with a marital rape exemption. Marital 
rape remains as criminal as stranger rape.
117. CALLIE RENNISON & MICHAEL RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS NATIONAL CRIME 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY 10 (2003). Additionally, for eight percent of women and girls, their first 
experience of sexual intercourse was involuntary. FERTILITY AND WOMEN’S HEALTH, supra note 7, at 
5. 
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that the defendant did not discuss the act in question with the partner. Other 
relevant evidence would be if the defendant lied to obtain penetration, 
failed to discuss safe sex with the partner, treated the partner as if he or she 
were an object without independent feelings or desires, or initiated 
penetration rapidly without discussion. Negotiation between partners would 
have to be verbal unless they had established a context between them in 
which they could reliably read one another’s non-verbal behavior.
B. NEGOTIATION APPLIED
The Negotiation Model provides an appropriate analytical framework 
for understanding the most common scenarios of acquaintance rape 
between teens or young people. Take the example of Adrienne’s rape that 
opened this article. Mike refused numerous opportunities to communicate 
with Adrienne and to consider what she felt or wanted. The sex was not a 
misunderstanding. He did not attempt to understand. He proceeded as if he 
were the only human being in the interaction and used her for his own ends. 
Aggressively indifferent to her pain, he penetrated her without asking if she 
wanted to be penetrated. He palmed her head as if it were an object and did 
not care that she choked and thought she was going to die. He treated 
Adrienne with contempt, as if she were a nothing. He failed at every turn to 
legitimate his actions by consulting with Adrienne and considering her 
needs, feelings, and humanity.
Unlike the consent models, the Negotiation Model does not focus on 
the actions of the victim to repel or invite a man’s sexual advances 
physically and verbally. Instead, the Negotiation Model focuses the legal 
issue where it should be: on what the defendant did to obtain an 
understanding of whether both partners wanted the sexual penetration to 
take place. The Negotiation Model understands the nature of sexual 
trauma—including physical paralysis and mental dissociation—and it is 
wary of the male propensity to misinterpret women’s nonverbal behavior as 
indicative of sexual intent. It thereby sheds new light on a few important 
rape cases.
Two cases that show up in many criminal law casebooks are 
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz,118 and State v. M.T.S.119 They represent the 
two ends of a spectrum on the question of whether the defendant must 
employ extrinsic physical force beyond that required to engage in 
nonconsensual penetration before the act in question is rape.
118. Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
119. In re M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
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1. Berkowitz
Berkowitz and his female victim were twenty- and nineteen-year-old 
college students, respectively. On the afternoon of the incident, the victim 
went to Berkowitz’s dorm room to find her friend. Berkowitz asked her to 
stay for a while, and she agreed. He asked her to give him a back rub, but 
she declined. He asked her to sit on his bed, but she refused and took a seat 
on the floor. Berkowitz then moved to the floor, lifted her shirt, and began 
massaging her breasts. She said “no” repeatedly. Berkowitz undid his pants 
and tried to put his penis in her mouth. She again said “no.” Berkowitz then 
locked the door from the inside, pushed the victim down on the bed, 
straddled and pinned her, and removed her pants and underwear from one 
leg. He then penetrated her vagina with his penis, withdrew, and ejaculated 
on her stomach. Both parties agreed that the victim said “no” throughout 
the encounter.120
In assessing the case, the intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania 
quoted extensively from the victim’s testimony. It pointed out:
The victim did not physically resist in any way while on the bed because 
appellant was on top of her, and she “couldn’t like go anywhere.” She 
did not scream out at anytime because, “[i]t was like a dream was 
happening or something.”121
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the 
victim did not consent, it decided that there was no rape because Berkowitz 
did not employ force.122
Berkowitz did not need to employ force. By pinning and straddling his
victim, Berkowitz made it clear that he intended to penetrate her despite her 
clear and repeated expressions of non-consent. He thereby intimidated her 
into a state of depersonalization, in which she felt as if she were in a 
dream.123
Berkowitz is an easy case for the No and Yes Models. Under the No 
Model, Berkowitz is guilty of sexual expropriation because the victim 
repeatedly said “no.” Under the Yes Model, Berkowitz is guilty of sexual 
120. See Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1339–42 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), aff’d by, 
641 A.2d 1161 (1994).
121. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
122. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164. (referencing the fact that victim said “no” throughout encounter 
and noting, “while such an allegation of fact would be relevant to the issue of consent, it is not relevant 
to the issue of force”).
123. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra note 70, at 530 (noting feature of episode of 
depersonalization is feeling “as if he or she is living in a dream or a movie”).
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abuse because he penetrated the victim when he knew he did not have her 
consent.
But what if the victim reacted to Berkowitz’s escalating sexual 
advances with more powerful symptoms of peritraumatic dissociation? 
What if, as a result, she became deeply passive and said nothing? Under the 
No Model, if she said nothing there would be no crime. Under the Yes 
Model, Berkowitz would argue that he had “conduct indicating affirmative, 
freely given permission to the act of sexual penetration.”124 After all, the 
victim was drinking when she came into his dorm room, she had stopped 
by his dorm room intoxicated before, and on a previous occasion she asked 
him the size of his penis. These are the arguments Berkowitz would make 
under the Yes Model.
Under the Negotiation Model, however, Berkowitz changes shape. 
Berkowitz failed to negotiate with his victim about whether he could 
penetrate her. The fact that she said “no” throughout the encounter simply 
underscores Berkowitz’s failure to consider her desires and boundaries. 
Even if she had never said “no,” Berkowitz could not simply press ahead to 
intercourse based on her passive reaction to his advances and his fantasy 
about what she meant when she asked him the size of his penis. He would 
have to ask her whether she wanted to be penetrated, or tell her that he 
wanted to have sex with her and ask if she wanted that, too. His failure to 
negotiate with her and come to an agreement about the sexual penetration 
would constitute rape.
2. M.T.S.
Seventeen-year-old M.T.S. was temporarily living with fifteen-year-
old C.G.’s family. C.G. accused him of sexual assault, but the two parties 
disputed the details of what happened on the instance in question.125
According to C.G., M.T.S. told her three or four times that he was 
going to make a surprise visit to her bedroom that night. She awoke early in 
the morning to find her shorts and underwear removed, and that M.T.S. had 
already maneuvered his penis inside her vagina. As soon as she realized 
what was happening, she slapped him and told him to get off her and get 
out, which he did.126
124. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 2 83.
125. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1267–69.
126. Id.
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According to M.T.S., by contrast, C.G. and he had engaged in “kissing 
and necking” during the three days before the instance in question. She 
encouraged him to make a surprise visit to her room late that night, which 
he did. They began to kiss and pet one another. They then engaged in 
consensual sex until the fourth thrust when C.G. told M.T.S. to stop, at 
which point he got off her. C.G. then slapped him.127
The trial court assessed the testimony in this way:
Faced with this sharply divergent testimony concerning the sexual 
activity, the trial judge made explicit factual findings. He determined that 
the couple had been [consensually] kissing and petting, had undressed 
and had gotten into the victim’s bed and then had sex, but that the actual 
sex act had not been consented to by the victim.128
The court also found that there was “no definite expressed refusal by 
the victim” at the time penetration occurred.129
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared, “[A]ny act of 
sexual penetration engaged in by the defendant without the affirmative and 
freely-given permission of the victim to the specific act of penetration 
constitutes the offense of sexual assault.”130 M.T.S. is an important case 
because it is the first in which a court adopted the Yes Model of rape law 
reform and, contrary to Berkowitz, did not require that the defendant 
employ a level of physical force beyond that required to engage in non-
consentual penetration.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reinstated the disposition of juvenile 
delinquency for M.T.S.’s commission of sexual assault. It noted, “[T]he 
factfinder must decide whether the defendant’s act of penetration was 
undertaken in circumstances that led the defendant reasonably to believe 
that the alleged victim had freely given affirmative permission to the 
specific act of sexual penetration,” and noted that permission “can be 
indicated either through words or through actions.”131
Many legal scholars heralded the case as a major step forward. But 
when one applies the principles of the Yes Model to the specific 
circumstances in which C.G. and M.T.S. found themselves, it is clear that 
the case could easily have gone and perhaps should have gone the other 
way.
127. Id.
128. In re M.T.S., 588 A.2d 1282, 1283 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) rev’d by, 609 A.2d 1266 (1992).
129. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1285.
130. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1277.
131. Id. at 1278.
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Under the facts as found by the trial court, C.G. consented to kissing 
and petting, got into bed with M.T.S., never said “no” or expressed any 
other form of refusal; and then M.T.S. penetrated her. Under the No Model, 
of course, without verbal objection there is no crime. Under the Yes Model, 
according to Schulhofer, “If she doesn’t say ‘no,’ and if her silence is 
combined with passionate kissing, hugging, and sexual touching, it is 
usually sensible to infer actual willingness.”132 C.G. was engaged in
exactly the kind of kissing and petting from which it would supposedly be 
“sensible” for M.T.S. to infer actual willingness. Under the Yes Model, 
therefore, without verbal objection, there was no crime. Despite the fact 
that the New Jersey Supreme Court deferred to the trial court in M.T.S., it 
noted, “[C]ases such as this are inherently fact sensitive and depend on the 
reasoned judgment and common sense of judges and juries.”133 Indeed, 
other judges and juries could have decided that M.T.S. had all the 
affirmative permission he needed to penetrate C.G.
Under the Negotiation Model, M.T.S. looks different. M.T.S. failed to 
discuss the sexual penetration with C.G. before he entered her. He neither 
told her what he wanted to do nor listened to her desires and boundaries. 
He could not interpret her wishes based on her body language. He could 
not rely on his assumption that necking meant consent to sexual 
penetration. He could not enter her without discussing it first. When two 
people engage in sexual penetration for the first time, negotiation is 
ethically and legally required.
3. Comparison of Models
The No Model permits a man to penetrate his partner rapidly as long 
as his partner does not object. In this sense, the No Model discourages 
negotiation, and instead encourages abrupt and unanticipated penetrative 
attempts. The Yes Model allows inexperienced teens enjoying sexual 
petting in their first “hookup”134 to assume they have actual consent to 
sexual penetration. The Negotiation Model, by contrast, requires that these 
teens (or anyone else engaged in first-time penetration) negotiate the sexual 
penetration afresh with new partners.
The common law called frozen fright in response to sexual trauma 
consent. The No Model (and even the Yes Model at times) calls the 
132. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 272.
133. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1279.
134. See generally Elizabeth L. Paul, Brian McManus & Allison Hayes, “Hookups”: 
Characteristics and Correlates of College Students’ Spontaneous and Anonymous Sexual Experiences, 
37 J. SEX RESEARCH 76 (2000).
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situation an unfortunate misunderstanding, and then calls it consent. Only 
the Negotiation Model requires partners to negotiate sexual penetration 
verbally unless they have established a context between them in which they 
may reliably read each other’s nonverbal behavior.
Sexual penetration requires negotiation. Those who want to engage in 
penetrative acts with someone else must communicate with their partners 
and consider their partners’ desires, not just their own. Under the 
Negotiation Model, penetrating a person’s body for one’s own sexual 
gratification without communication and without consideration of that 
person’s wishes is against the law.
The Negotiation Model would require more than any state currently 
requires from those who engage in sexual penetration. Instead of imposing 
on the victim a verbal imperative to object, as the No Model does, or
allowing a man to imaginatively interpret a woman’s body language, as the 
Yes Model does, the Negotiation Model would require a person who 
sought to initiate penetration with another to consult with his or her partner, 
at least until there is custom between them that would provide a meaningful 
context in which to interpret body language.
C. OBJECTIONS TO NEGOTIATION
One could lodge a number of objections to the Negotiation Model of 
rape law reform. I will address three of them here: the notions that the 
Negotiation Model would criminalize all sex, face insuperable evidentiary 
hurdles, or kill romance altogether. Although each raises serious concerns, 
none should dissuade efforts to reform rape law based on the Negotiation 
Model.
1. Criminalizing Sex
One objection to the Negotiation Model of rape law reform is that it 
would be inconsistent with social and sexual mores. Because people do not 
negotiate sexual behaviors with their partners, some might argue, the 
Negotiation Model would categorize almost all sex as rape.
Although the empirical data is limited, it indicates that negotiation of 
sexual practices between at least younger sexual partners is widespread. A 
nationally representative random sample survey of 1800 fifteen- to twenty-
four-year-olds indicates that eighty-four percent of sexually active 
adolescents and young adults have had a conversation with their partners 
about what they feel comfortable doing sexually, and ninety-two percent 
have had a conversation with their partners about the use of birth control or 
CLEAN EDIT
2005] NEGOTIATING SEX 133
condoms.135 In an age of sexually transmitted diseases, the vast majority of 
teenagers and young adults correctly feel the need to confer with their 
partners about sexual practices and the use of contraceptives.
But what about the remaining sixteen percent of sexually active young 
people, who have not had a conversation with their partners about what 
they feel comfortable doing sexually? Would they lack fair notice that 
negotiation would be legally required before sexual penetration would be 
legitimate? The due process clause in the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
ex post facto clause in Article I, Section Ten of the U.S. Constitution 
require that courts and legislatures impose criminal laws on defendants 
only prospectively. To maximize fair notice, before or once a rape law 
based on the Negotiation Model is passed in a jurisdiction, there must be 
widespread public education on television, in schools, and in the media 
about the ethical and legal importance of negotiating sexual penetration.
Because the vast majority of rapes occur when the victim is between 
the ages of twelve and twenty-four, there must be a particular focus on 
education in schools. States should employ sexual education classes to 
teach both the importance and the practice of sexual negotiation. Virtually 
all public schools provide some sexual education between the seventh and 
twelfth grades.136 Sexual education classes provide a natural forum for 
teaching young people how to set sexual boundaries and express desires, as 
well as the significance of respecting their partner’s boundaries. Many 
peer-education workshops on college campuses and sexual education 
classes in secondary schools already emphasize the importance of obtaining 
affirmative consent through talking with one’s partner before engaging in 
penetrative acts.137
Currently, however, most sexual education in public schools leaves 
students sexually ignorant, particularly when it comes to negotiating sexual 
135. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS & YOUNG 
ADULTS: SEXUAL HEALTH KNOWLEDGE, ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES 19 tbl.13 (2003), 
http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/upload/14269_1.pdf (last visited May 30, 2005) [hereinafter 
NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS & YOUNG ADULTS]. 
 136. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SEX EDUCATION IN AMERICA: A SERIES OF NATIONAL 
SURVEYS OF STUDENTS, PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND PRINCIPALS 2 (2000), 
http://www.kff.org/youthhivstds/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=13531
(last visited May 29, 2005) [hereinafter SEX EDUCATION IN AMERICA]. Thirty-eight states and the 
District of Columbia mandate that their public schools teach sexual education, STD/HIV education, or 
both. ALAN GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: SEX AND STD/HIV EDUCATION (2005), 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_SE.pdf (last visited May 29, 2005). In the remaining 
twelve states, although sexual and HIV education are not mandated by statute, such education is 
nonetheless widespread. Id.
137. See SANDAY, supra note 113, at 266.
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desires and boundaries. One-third of schools nationwide maintain a sexual 
education curriculum that is “abstinence-only,” and those schools with 
“comprehensive” sexual education still focus their message on sexual 
abstinence.138 In 1999, for example, twenty-three percent of sexual 
education teachers taught sexual abstinence as the only method of 
preventing pregnancy and STDs, compared with just two percent who did 
so in 1988.139
Schools must substantially revise sexual education, therefore, to 
provide children with full and accurate health information on the realities 
and risks of sexual intimacy. It also must incorporate the sexual negotiation 
of desires and boundaries. The need to employ school sexual education 
programs to teach sexual negotiation could not be more urgent. By the time 
they graduate from high school, almost two-thirds of students will have 
engaged in sexual intercourse.140 About a third of adolescents and young 
adults have experienced pressure to have sex.141 Every year approximately 
750,000  girls between the ages of fifteen and nineteen have an unintended 
pregnancy.142 Nearly one-in-four sexually active young people contracts a 
sexually transmitted disease each year, and one-half of new HIV infections 
in this country occur among people under the age of twenty-five.143
Moreover, students want more education about sexual negotiation. 
Teens and young adults often feel awkward and uncomfortable when it 
comes to discussing sexuality, yet sexual education does not consistently 
teach negotiation skills.144 Forty-six percent of students who have had 
sexual education say they need more information about how to talk to their 
138. SEX EDUCATION IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 14; David J. Landry, Lisa Kaeser & Cory L. 
Richards, Abstinence Promotion and the Provision of Information About Contraception in Public 
School District Sexuality Education Policies, 31 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 280, 283 (1999).
139. Jacqueline E. Darroch, David J. Landry & Susheela Singh, Changing Emphases in Sexuality 
Education in U.S. Public Secondary Schools, 1988–1999, 32 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 204, 209 (2000). 
Moreover, the decade between 1988 and 1999 saw a decline in the number of sexual education teachers 
who supported discussing topics such as homosexuality, abortion, and birth control. Id. at 206–07. 
Almost one in five students report that sexual education in their schools presents sexual intercourse as 
“something to fear and avoid.” SEX EDUCATION IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 19. Approximately one
fifth of sexual education classes teach that abortion (20%), homosexuality (18%), and masturbation 
(17%) are “immoral or wrong.” Id. at 20.
140. NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 135, at 12.
141. Id. at 3. Nine percent of sexually active adolescents say they were 13 or younger when they 
first had sexual intercourse. Id. Seventy-six percent of people aged 15–24 report that sexual violence is 
a “very” or “somewhat” big concern facing people their age. Id. at 6 tbl.1.
142. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., IT’S YOUR (SEX) LIFE: YOUR GUIDE TO SAFE & 
RESPONSIBLE SEX 6 (2004), http://www.kff.org/entpartnerships/upload/27993_1.pdf (last visited May 
30, 2005) [hereinafter IT’S YOUR (SEX) LIFE].
143. NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 135, at 2.
144. SEX EDUCATION IN AMERICA, supra note 136, at 19.
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partners about birth control and sexually transmitted diseases; the same 
percentage wants more information about how to deal with the emotional 
issues surrounding sex.145 Fifty-five percent want more information about 
what to do if they or a friend have been raped or assaulted.146 In short, 
young people “want more instruction on communicating effectively with 
partners about sensitive sexual concerns and relationship issues.”147 It is 
time to give them that instruction. Along with education through television, 
newspaper, radio, and other media, enhanced sexual education in schools 
would be one mechanism to provide fair notice of the ethical and legal 
importance of sexual negotiation, so people could conform their conduct to 
the requirements of the law.
2. He Said/She Said
A second objection to the Negotiation Model of rape law reform is 
that it faces evidentiary problems. Under this view, allegations of rape 
would too often fall into the proverbial “he said/she said” quagmire. This 
problem is certainly not unique to the Negotiation Model, of course. Under 
status quo, for example, he often alleges that she willingly engaged in 
sexual intercourse while she alleges that he coerced her by pinning her 
down and forcing himself upon her. Under the No Model, he alleges that 
she willingly engaged in sexual intercourse and she alleges that she said 
“no” and he penetrated her in spite of her clear protests. Under the Yes 
Model, he alleges that she willingly engaged in sexual intercourse by 
giving him nonverbal permission for it and she alleges that her actions 
could not have been reasonably interpreted as an expression of consent. 
Unless the law requires physical evidence of force (bruises, knife wounds, 
broken bones, etc.), which would exempt the vast majority of rapes from 
legal purview,148 the decision-maker in a rape case will invariably have to 
weigh the relative credibility of the affiants and decide whether or not the 
state has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the law makes exactly these kinds of credibility 
determinations in other kinds of disputes and we do not imagine that justice 
has crumbled. In cases involving verbal contracts for the sale of goods, the 
directly conflicting testimony of the plaintiff and defendant may be the 
only evidence offered. Judges and juries are trusted to parse the evidence 
145. Id. at 5.
146. Id.
147. NATIONAL SURVEY OF ADOLESCENTS & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 135, at 2.
148. Anderson, supra note 12, at 1003 n.298. (noting studies that indicate offenders in 
acquaintance rapes use high level of verbal abuse but little physical force).
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carefully and determine whether the plaintiff has met the requisite burden 
of proof. In criminal cases involving fraud, robbery, conspiracy, assault, 
and extortion, for example, often the only evidence is the directly 
conflicting testimony of the alleged victim and the defendant. Judges and 
juries are trusted to determine whether the prosecution has proven its case 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Negotiation Model does not reach into the bedroom further than 
other models of rape law reform. The law is already in the bedroom, asking 
questions and trying to prevent abuse. The Negotiation Model simply asks 
a different question. Again, instead of asking, “What did she let him do?” 
because she failed to object or granted nonverbal permission with a wink 
and a nudge, the Negotiation Model asks, “Did the person who initiated 
sexual penetration negotiate with his or her partner and thereby obtain 
agreement that sexual penetration should occur?” The dispute would be 
about whether that kind of communication occurred, and decision-makers 
would have to assess the credibility of testimony around that question.
3. Killing Romance
A final objection to the Negotiation Model of rape law reform might 
be that requiring verbal negotiation between sexual partners, at least until 
they establish a custom between them, would kill the romance of sex. Here 
again, advocates for the No and Yes Models agree. Dripps argues that 
“insisting on express affirmative permission to exempt intercourse from 
moral or legal sanction” would result in a significant loss:
What would be lost is some of the spontaneity, some of the intensity, that 
gives sex its special pleasure. It is possible, after all, to be too diffident 
or too analytical in bed, whatever our gender or orientation. Call it 
“eroticized domination,” call it the “robust, uncomplicated lay”—call it 
whatever you like, but don’t deny that, from whatever causes, the loss of 
control is a central feature of sexual experience.149
Schulhofer concurs. The requirement of verbal discourse before sexual 
penetration would “impos[e] a degree of formality and artificiality on 
human interactions in which spontaneity is especially important.”150
The reality, however, is that AIDS killed the romance of 
uncommunicative sex twenty years ago.151 Individuals mourned and 
149. Dripps, Panel Discussion, supra note 53, at 147.
150. SCHULHOFER, supra note 17, at 272.
151. In the words of one Antioch College student, “How can you communicate that you’re HIV 
positive if you don’t talk about sex?” SANDAY, supra note 113, at 275.
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continue to bemoan the loss of spontaneity and the imposition of formality 
that the use of condoms has created,152 but we have managed to overcome 
those objections without the death of Eros.
For some, employing language to communicate mutual preferences 
and boundaries may conflict ominously with their fantasies of how 
individuals should enact sexual desire. These people should probably 
negotiate sexual penetration well in advance of their trysts.
For others, words can be at least as exciting as silence. They may use 
negotiation itself as an opportunity to develop affection and heighten 
mutual desire. People will respond differently and creatively to the 
demands of verbal discourse in their erotic lives. Sexual passion will likely 
thrive, so less encumbered as it will be by the threat of rape.
CONCLUSION
The Negotiation Model of rape law reform encourages sexual partners 
to treat each other with humanity, and it helps ensure that they agree to 
sexual penetration before it occurs. Coupled with extensive popular 
education, the Negotiation Model would help change sexual mores in a 
positive way. Particularly in an age of widespread sexual assault and 
sexually transmitted diseases, the law should require people to ask about 
sexual penetration with their new partners before penetration occurs.
Rape happens at an alarming rate. It causes devastating emotional and 
psychological harm. Yet by remaining focused on force and consent, the 
law has utterly failed to redress the crime. The intimate and serious nature 
of penetration is why negotiation is so crucial to its legitimacy. Still trained 
too often to acquiesce to male desire, a girl may go along physically with a 
boy beyond where she feels comfortable. Kissing leads to necking leads to 
fondling. It has now gone too far, and the girl knows it. She may freeze in 
terror, or mentally and emotionally leave the scene. At that point, under the 
common law, the boy may legally penetrate her because he did not have to 
use force to get there. Under the No Model, he may legally penetrate her 
because she failed to object verbally. Under the Yes Model, he may legally 
penetrate her because she engaged in kissing and heavy petting, a 
functional “yes” in his imagination. Under the Negotiation Model, he may 
152. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF MASS. LOWELL COUNSELING CTR., TALKING TO YOUR PARTNER 
ABOUT CONDOM USE (Dec. 1990), http://www.uml.edu/student-services/counseling/condom/; IT’S 
YOUR (SEX) LIFE, supra note 142, at 15.
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not penetrate her, no matter the kissing and necking shared, nor his hopeful 
interpretation thereof, until he breaks out of his solipsistic universe and 
engages the girl—another human being whose desires and boundaries 
matter—in a conversation.
